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Abstract 
Air Traffic demand in Latin America is expected to double over the next twenty years, yet 
airline profitability in the region remains highly problematic. The impediments challenging 
financial prosperity in the continent are numerous and have resulted in prolonged loss-making 
periods across most Latin American carriers. Breaking with this trend, Copa Airlines has been 
able to report double-digit net results for several years and recorded 56% of total profits earned 
by all Latin American carriers in 2016. This research has identified a number of Key 
Performance Indicators that have underpinned Copa Airlines’ financial prosperity through a 
Product and Organisational Architecture (POA) framework analysis whose results were 
validated and elaborated upon by the CEO of Copa Airlines. Copa’s sustained financial success 
was attributable to a number of factors. First, its geographical positioning has allowed it to 
engineer strong connectivity by coupling North and South America through its hub, which is 
reachable with narrowbodies to nearly all points in the Americas. Second, its low unit cost 
structure is akin to that of LCCs, operating a single aircraft type with high utilization. Third, it 
has a uniquely low market concentration of competitors on its routes and capitalizes on this by 
having a strong schedule with high frequencies together with outstanding punctuality. Fourth, 
it has a synergistic and fruitful cooperation with its hub airport at Tocumen. Finally it benefits 
from positive external factors such as a dollarized home economy with high GDP growth, 
exceptionally low unemployment and inflation rates ring-fenced with security. These pillars 
can be used as a reference for other Latin based airlines seeking to improve profitability.  
 








Latin America is comprised of nineteen sovereign states and the continent is a cluster of several 
heterogeneous operating environments. The region comprises 13% of the world’s landmass, 
but only accounts for 5.2% of the global air passenger market, a significantly lower share when 
compared to Europe and the US with 26% and 24% respectively (IATA, 2018, World Bank, 
2017). However airfares have fallen by more than 50% since 2002 and passenger numbers have 
trebled, while passenger demand in the region is forecasted to grow from 298 million in 2015 
to 658 million by 2035 (ALTA, 2016). The annual travel rate per capita for Latin America is 
less than 1%, but the region has great potential for growth with a burgeoning middle class with 
higher disposable incomes encircled by an amplifying economic outlook, while the fleet is 
expected to more than double over the next 20 years to almost 4,500 aircraft (Ascend, 2018; 
CAPA, 2017; Euromonitor, 2017). The FAA (2016) reinforced the magnitude of Latin America 
by reporting that it remains the largest international destination for US carriers.  
 
However airline profitability remains elusive and problematic in Latin America as it is 
constantly hindered by numerous challenges including: high operating costs; weak yields; very 
high airport charges; navigation taxes; strict and burdensome government regulations; 
restrictive, outdated or non-existent air service agreements; and an inefficient and outdated 
aviation infrastructure. As a consequence Latin American carriers continue to underperform 
financially. Over a 6 year period from 2011 to 2016, Latin American carriers averaged net 
losses of $900,000 while in 2016 they produced an average of $600,000 in profits, representing 
just 3% of global net profits of $34.8 billion, while their counterparts in North America 
accounted for over 47% of net profits (IATA WATS, 2017; IATA WATS 2014). In 2016, Latin 
American carriers earned just $2.15 net profit per passenger, while industry-wide airlines 
averaged $9.13 – more than 4 times that of Latin America (IATA WATS, 2017). The situation 
has not changed over the decades as Copper et al. (1995) conducted a Delphi study in the early 
1990s of Latin American airlines whose respondents rated ‘generating profits’ as a low priority. 
However, within the quagmire of underperforming Latin American carriers, Copa Airlines has 
been a shining star as it has attained financial prosperity combined with superior operational 
efficiency for sustained periods whilst operating in the continent’s difficult environment. 
Noteworthy is that Copa Airlines’ profits comprised around 56% of total profits earned by 
Latin American carriers in 2016, while it produced the world’s 3rd strongest operating margin 
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in 2017, registering 18% as well as the world’s 3rd best net margin of 15%. In Q1 2018, it 
attained the world’s highest operating and net margin of 20% and 19% respectively 
(Flightglobal, 2018; Airline Weekly, 2018). For most of the last decade it generated double-
digit operating and net margins. This unprecedented and sustained profitability of a Latin 
American airline merited deeper investigation to uncover its differentiated strategies that 
underpin its prosperity in such a difficult geographical setting. The aim of this paper is to 
outline the key strategic drivers that underpin Copa Airlines’ financial prosperity when 
compared with the remaining dominant carriers on the continent.  
 
The findings may provide a blueprint of recommendations for other airlines operating in Latin 
America to improve their profitability. The objectives of the paper are three fold. First, to 
understand the Latin American air transport market by outlining the challenges and to 
categorise market concentration levels of the continent’s seat capacity. Second, to pinpoint 
which elements of Copa Airlines’ business model contributes to its continued profitability, 
when benchmarked against the remaining dominant carriers in Latin America and third, to 
provide supporting empirical evidence on each of the elements that positively contributes to 
Copa Airlines’ profitability as corroborated by its CEO.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the current situation in the Latin American 
market. Section 3 outlines the research methodology. Section 4 presents the results from the 
Pareto Analysis and Product and Organisational Architecture (POA) framework pinpointing 
the characteristics that specifically contribute to Copa Airlines’ prolonged profitability. Section 
5 outlines the specific elements that have contributed to Copa’s financial prosperity, which 
were validated by its CEO. Section 6 concludes the research.   
 
2.0 Understanding the Latin American Air Transport Market 
 
Commercial aviation within Latin America has been historically limited due to significant costs 
and political challenges. Firstly, fuel costs are very high, despite it being an oil producing 
region and prices are strictly controlled by governments. Only 4% of global aviation fuel 
consumption emanates from the region, resulting in insufficient bargaining power for most 
airlines (Recio, 2016; S&P Global Platts, 2017). Furthermore, the weakness of currencies in 
the region makes fuel acquisition, generally purchased in US dollars, noticeably more 
expensive (IATA, 2016). Secondly, international passenger taxes and charges are excessive 
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with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru charging $130, $110, $104 and $80 per traveler 
respectively (SEO Amsterdam Economics, 2016). Latin America is one of the most expensive 
regions in the world in terms of passenger and airline charges - in some cases, taxes and 
boarding fees represent more than 40% of passenger final ticket prices (CAPA, 2017). Thirdly, 
maintenance costs are higher than in other regions of the world due to the scarcity of 
Maintenance, Repair and Operations (MRO) providers across the continent (Recio, 2016). 
Fourthly, operational performance falls beneath their peers from other international territories. 
Heinz and O’Connell (2013) stated that aircraft utilisation in Latin America remains among 
the lowest in the world due to flying restrictions and ageing aircraft – the average age of the 
fleet resides at 15.6 years, compared to the Asia Pacific region at 9.6 years and the Middle East 
at 10.8 years (CAPA, 2017; Flightglobal, 2017; Redpath et al. 2016). Fifthly, equity and debt 
financing are exorbitant for Latin American carriers due to the risky economic perception of 
the region coupled with depreciating currencies, which increment costs (Rodrigues et al. 2017). 
Lastly and importantly, burdensome regulatory conditions have slowed the prosperity and 
development of the continent. Due to the lack of a common regulatory mechanism in Latin 
America, each state has independent, bilateral or multilateral agreements, regulatory policies 
and ownership limitations. There are 45 different provisions for a population of 580 million 
inhabitants, whereas markets with similar populations (The United States or Europe) have a 
single directive for traffic rights (ALTA, 2016; CAPA, 2017).  
 
To bypass these regulations, carriers have elected to franchise, which has significantly changed 
the landscape of aviation in Latin America over the last decade. Through franchising initiatives, 
Latin American carriers have enlarged their geographical footprint, allowing them to 
circumnavigate strict regulations across the continent and produce an extensive network within 
and beyond the continent. Subsequently they have contributed significantly to traffic 
concentration. Unlike consolidation in Europe, where groups keep separate brands, the strategy 
followed in Latin America has been to unify carrier branding in order to develop a pan-Latin 
American identity (Air Transport World, 2015; CAPA, 2016). An example of the complex 
LATAM franchise hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 1. It is one of the biggest airline groups in 
the world in terms of network connections while the carrier has a significant presence in a large 
number of Latin American markets with sizable equity portfolios. The continent’s Low-Cost 
Carriers have also replicated this strategy as VivaAerobus, for example, has initiated this 
arrangement with Colombian and Peruvian subsidiaries, while Volaris has imitated competitors 
with a Costa Rican affiliate. Copa Airlines on the other hand has not franchised, instead 
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retaining a simplified structural organisational framework. In 2005, it acquired a 99.9% equity 
in Columbian based AeroRepublica and rebranded it to Copa Airlines Colombia, the second 
largest carrier in Colombia in terms of passengers carried. The equity partner has an operational 
relationship with its parent company in Panama by integrating its route network with Copa, 
capitalising on aircraft interchange and improving overall efficiency (Copa Airlines, 2017). In 
December 2016, Copa Airlines launched a new low cost carrier in Colombia called Wingo in 
order to diversify its offerings and compete with other such carriers from Colombia.  
 
 
Fig.1. LATAM Airlines Organisation Chart 2016 
Source: CAPA, 2017; Flight Global, 2017; LATAM Airlines Group S.A., 2017 
 
Another feature that distinguishes the air transport market in Latin America from the rest of 
the world is the concentration of the continent’s seat capacity. Currently, there is a high 
concentration and dominance of only a few carriers, who control a large proportion of the 
region’s capacity (ALTA, 2016). Capacity is highly skewed in particular regions, producing a 
geographical imbalance, which is largely attributed to the wide ranging demographic and 
economic macro-conditions within the continent. Figure 2 shows the concentration of the 
continent’s traffic as measured by ASKs for 2016. A large proportion of traffic is concentrated 
in Mexico and Brazil, which is correlated with the region’s most populous countries with strong 
GDP proliferation. Brazil’s population and economy account for one-third of the Latin 
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American total while air transport comprises 28% of the total. Similarly, Mexico’s population 
and economy account for 22% and 20% respectively of the regions’ composition and has 21% 
of the continents seat capacity. When Argentina, Colombia and Chile are aggregated with the 
two countries listed above, together they control around 70% of air traffic in Latin America – 
this is highly relevant because Copa Airlines from Panama generated 56% of the total profits 
in Latin America in 2016 without this advantage. Figure 2 shows that Copa Airlines’ domiciled 
hub, in Panama City has a sizable capacity throughput when compared to other cities within 
the continent, despite having significantly smaller GDP and population demographics. It is 
ideally situated on the isthmus connecting North and South America and termed the ’Hub of 
the Americas’, which has allowed it to engineer higher levels of connecting traffic.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Concentration of traffic in Latin America by ASKs in 2016.  







3.0 Research Methodology 
 
The second objective of this research, after having summarised the main airline business 
models and Copa’s position on the spectrum, is to pinpoint which elements of Copa Airlines’ 
business model contributes to its continued profitability, whereby each element is benchmarked 
against the remaining dominant carriers within Latin America to determine the level of Copa’s 
relative performance. This result was extrapolated through two phases: First, the Pareto 
principle (80/20 rule) was applied to narrow down the 83 operating airlines in the continent 
into a more manageable sample of 8 airlines that control 80% of the market, which then 
becomes the objects of research evaluation. The region is dominated by five main full-service 
airline groups notably: LATAM, Avianca, Aeromexico, Copa Airlines and Aerolineas 
Argentinas, accounting for about 64% of total capacity offered by Latin American carriers. 
When the region’s three largest LCCs (Gol, Volaris and Azul) are added, these eight carriers 
control 80 percent of the marketplace as illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 4 illustrates a graphical 
cluster of all 83 airlines in Latin America, showing that the top 14 carriers control almost 95% 
of the total capacity offered, while the LCCs captured 27% of the market by 2016 (OAG, 2017).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Pareto analysis of Latin American Airlines in 2016 





Fig. 4. Graphical Cluster of all 83 airlines in Latin America 2016 
Source: OAG 
 
The second phase of the research on business models has become an important aspect for both 
academia and management with the purpose of accurately describing a company’s value 
generation system with a manageable number of components (Wirtz et al., 2016). Several 
researchers have derived a number of key elements that should be pivotal to an airline’s 
business model, which include (with the number of key elements in parentheses): Mason and 
Morrison, 2008 (11 key elements1); Daft and Albers, 2013 (7); Lohmann and Koo, 2013 (6); 
Daft and Albers, 2015 (8); Jean and Lohmann, 2016 (6) and Corbo, 2017 (10). Soyk et al. 
(2018) conclude that two different airline business model frameworks have been developed 
and applied from an industry-specific perspective. Firstly, Mason and Morrison (2008) 
developed the Product and Organizational Architecture framework, which differentiates 
                                                          
1 Profitability, Cost drivers, Revenue, Connectivity, Convenience, Comfort, Distribution and sales, Aircraft, 















between the product and the organisational architecture of an airline. The product aspect 
contains service quality elements that relate the product to consumer preferences, namely 
connectivity, convenience, and comfort. The organisational architecture describes the vertical 
structure, production and distribution/sales elements. The second key airline-related 
framework stems from Daft and Albers (2013; 2015) and it differentiates between corporate 
core logic, configuration of value chain activities and assets. The most popularised 
methodology in the literature adopted the Mason and Morrison approach as it was applied by: 
Lohmann and Koo (2013) on US carriers; Heinz and O’Connell (2013) on African carriers; 
Lenartowicz et al. (2013) on EU low cost carriers. Meanwhile Meichner et al. (2018) also 
adopted the concept on African carriers where a POA model was applied to highlight the 
importance of each characteristic to the airlines' overall performance for the five largest African 
full service airlines.  
 
Thus a Product and Organisational Architecture (POA) model analysis was performed on the 
six largest Latin American airlines (excluding Aerolineas Argentinas2), that accounted for 80% 
of total traffic in the continent as depicted in the Pareto analysis above. Each key element in 
the POA is evaluated through a conceptual framework whereby the importance of each item to 
overall performance is assessed and benchmarked against the main dominant Latin American 
airlines that provide 80% of overall capacity. The earlier POA model engineered by Mason and 
Morrison (2008) was extensively developed to capture a wider range of factors including 
ancillary revenues. It was also evolved to incorporate external factors that include economic, 
political and macroeconomic impacts, which are pertinent to the Latin American market and 
constitute a major reasoning for the underperforming domiciled carriers that operate there. 
Figure 5 illustrates the adapted POA model structure that was applied.  
 
                                                          
2 The Argentinean flag carrier was not analysed as there was very limited public data available because of its 




Fig. 5. Adaptation of the product and organisational architecture model for airlines  
 
The methodology employed to calculate the relevant indices to benchmark the performance of 
the sampled airlines includes four different steps, following Mason & Morrison (2008) 
guidelines:  
 
3.1 Data collection of the performance metrics (POA) 
To measure each of the performance indices, data from different sources has been defined and 
calculated. Table 1 gives a summary of the applied indices and metrics, while Table 3 in the 
Annex outlines the calculations for the performance ratios of the airlines in 2016 used in the 











Table 1  
Summary of applied indices and metrics 
 
 
3.2 Benchmark ratios calculation (POA) 
The performance metric data listed in Table 1 was benchmarked against other Latin America 
carriers. This paper capitalised on the methodology developed by Mason and Morrison (2008). 
They used different scales for CASK and Yield to perform the benchmarking analysis and 
therefore the revised evaluation used in this study is more robust and consistent, leading to 
more accurate and comparable results. This research has corrected the methodological problem, 
by using a consistent scale which captured a wider calibration ranging from 0 (worst in class) 
to 1 (best in class). Depending on the features of the data, the highest or, on the contrary, the 
lowest scores will be used as the “best in class” performer – for example lower values of CASK 
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indicate a better performance. The methodology for the benchmarking ratios is shown in Table 
2. Table 4 in the Annex outlines the calculations for the benchmark ratios for 2016. 
 
Table 2  
Developed POA equations 
 
3.3 Weighted Ratios Calculation (POA) 
After calculating the benchmarking ratios, each item result was assigned a weight in relation 
with the impact that it has on the profitability of the airline. Therefore metrics are weighted 
based on a correlation of the benchmark item against profitability.  
 
  
PREVIOUS STUDIES METHODOLOGY DEVELOPED METHODOLOGY 
Original Equations Developed Equations 
Mason & Morrison (2008)  Author (2017) 
B.R. MIN: Benchmarking Ratio MINIMUM score is “best in class” 







CASK Index is a representation of a MINIMUM benchmark ratio. 





3.4 Final ratios calculation (POA) 
Weighted indices are benchmarked with the best performer for each key element in the 
analysis. As a result, the final index to be obtained was calculated with the following equation:  
 
 
Table 5 in the Annex outlines the calculations for the final scores pertaining to 2016 data. 
 
4.0 Deductions from the POA data  
 
The applied analysis is summarised into radar plots to depict the key elements between Copa 
Airlines and the large dominant carriers within Latin America, which were further separated 
by their business models depicting full service and low cost carriers. The results of the data are 
illustrated over a time line taken from 2012, 2014 and 2016, which are correspondingly 
illustrated in Figures 6, 7 and 8 respectively. There are specific patterns emerging as the 
analysis detects that the region’s full service airlines share common characteristics, while the 
LCCs share a unique set of different indices. The full service network airlines show a strong 
performance in the product architecture area as these carriers have employed product 
differentiation strategies that include: offering a high level of connectivity permutations 
(routes, network density, code sharing); convenience (frequency, punctuality, airport 
attractiveness); together with comfort (on-board services, seating and quality).  
 
Connectivity permutations are a core competency of the hub and spoke apparatus of full service 
airlines throughout the world including Latin America as it facilities the seamless movement 
of passengers through a central hub. The science involves the synchronisation of incoming 
flights to provide maximum feed for departing aircraft (narrowbody or widebody) waiting to 
take-up their multi-origin share of incoming passengers. This form of scheduling creates a bank 
of many incoming flights arriving almost simultaneously, followed by a wave of departures. 
When traffic is aggregated from code share agreements or through alliance/equity partnerships, 
it produces an even larger traffic multiplier and is a major element in the ethos of Latin 
American carriers as depicted in Figures 6, 7 and 8 (Akca, 2018; O’Connell and Bueno, 2016; 
Logothetis and Miyoshi, 2016; Alderighi et al., 2005; Dennis, 1994). Aeromexico has the most 
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connected airline hub in Latin America serving over 95 destinations, of which 43 points in its 
network reached domestic points. Over one-third of its traffic is now connecting through its 
hub airport, up considerably from 21% which it achieved in 2010 according to MIDT data. 
Mexico has the 11th largest domestic market in the world in terms of seat capacity but it is the 
international seat capacity (over 50%) that is now beginning to overtake and gain more traction 
as Aeromexico expands its international footprint.  
 
Convenience was another important performance indicator for the full service airlines as 
research by Medina-Muñoz et al. (2018) found that there were 16 previous studies that depicted 
that the flight schedule including frequency is considered an important entity, when choosing 
an airline or a flight, while 11 such studies identified punctuality. Convenience remains an 
embedded differentiator of Latin American carriers. Aeromexico and Avianca are forming JVs 
with American based airlines under anti-trust immunity, which allows them to align frequent 
flyer programs, integrate services, coordinate pricing and flight schedules while at the same 
time improve airport facilities, which inevitably make services more convenient for passengers.  
 
Providing comfort and service quality has become pinnacle in remaining competitive. The full 
service airlines rely on producing added value and consumer-driven product differentiation 
beyond the basics of the LCC product (Belobaba, 2016; Pearson and Merkert, 2014; Merkert 
and Hensher, 2011; O’Connell 2011; Forsyth and Dwyer, 2010). The delivery of high-quality 
service is essential for the survival of full service airlines, which facilitates in gaining and 
maintaining customer satisfaction and loyalty. It also leads to creating competitive pressure 
among airlines (Clemes et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011). Avianca, for example, was recognised 
as ‘One of the Best Airlines in the World’ by the Condé Nast Traveller magazine in 2016, while 
one of its corporate statements is to provide an ‘Exceptional Experience’ to its passengers. In 
2017, Avianca was recognised by Skytrax, TripAdvisor and OCU for different aspects of 
outstanding service and high customer perceptions (Avianca holdings, 2018; The European, 
2019). Meanwhile LATAM is initiating a record investment of $400 million to transform the 
cabins and offer the best travel experience (LATAM, 2018). High comfort standards are an 
ingrained commitment to passengers who travel with Latin American full service airlines as 
portrayed in Figures, 6, 7 and 8.  
 
However, these full service carriers have obtained lower scores in the organisational 
architecture segment especially in such areas as labour productivity, sales and distribution 
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optimisation and airport charges, which mirror similar such attributes found in other full service 
network airlines around the world (Efthymiou and Papatheodorou, 2018; O’Connell and 
Bueno, 2016; Gillen, 2011; O’Connell, 2011; Doganis, 2010; O’Connell, 2006; Gillen, 2005; 
Morrell, 2005; Hanlon, 1996). Despite showing the strongest revenues, these full service 
carriers have an inefficient cost structure, weak market structure (traffic concentration) and an 
unfavourable external environment, which are the primary drivers in delivering the 
underperforming profits. An inefficient cost structure is commonplace across these Latin 
American full service airlines, triggered by the usual characteristics associated with legacy 
carriers such as high labour costs and overstaffing as they have some of the highest ratios of 
employees per passenger or employees per aircraft. Aerolineas Argentinas, for example 
transports just 755 passengers per employee, while Gol has a highly productive workforce 
resulting in a ratio of 2,187 passengers per fulltime equivalent employee for 2018 (Gol, 2018; 
CAPA, 2019). Volaris, has one of the best ratios for labour productivity, with only 66 
employees per aircraft, compared to 125-150 for the FSCs. They are also characterised by aging 
aircraft that reduce utilisation rates and increase maintenance costs. 
 
Meanwhile the Latin American low cost carriers reflect a different set of structural dimensions, 
operating characteristics and specifications. They enshrine the concept of ‘low cost’ into their 
organisational culture and apply simplicity into their operational manifest with attributes such 
as simplified fleet (one aircraft type) and point-to-point routings, for example. The Latin 
American based LCCs in Figures 6, 7 and 8 illustrate that they have thrived in the 
organisational architecture area, capitalising in a number of metrics that include: use of 
secondary airports; high aircraft utilisation; strong online sales penetration; and ancillary 
revenues. Low cost carriers from Latin America strive to use airports with low aeronautical 
charges, a lack of congestion and those that have the ability to facilitate quick aircraft 
turnarounds. They have the flexibility to negotiate favourable airport charges, especially when 
in competition with other airports. Mason and Morrison (2008) found that four airport related 
factors (airport cost, airport size, number of competing airlines and monopoly routes) were key 
elements underpinning the LCC model. VivaColombia, for example, is operating into the 
newer Panama Pacifico Airport in place of Tocumen International Airport in Panama. 
Warnock-Smith and Potter, (2005) found that by avoiding congested airports, LCCs may 





High aircraft utilisation is a preeminent feature of LCCs throughout the world including Latin 
America, which allows them to generate more revenue and dilute fixed costs like depreciation, 
insurance and overheads. Zuidberg (2014) conducted an econometric analysis of the costs 
associated with operating an aircraft and found quantifiably that airlines can achieve noticeable 
cost savings per aircraft by maximising its utilisation rate. Mantin and Wang (2012) found a 
positive relationship between aircraft utilisation and profitability. Gol and Volaris operated 
their aircraft 11.8 and 13.2 block hours per day respectively in 2018, compared to Avianca’s 
9.7 block hours (Avianca holdings, 2018; Gol, 2018; Volaris, 2018).  
 
A high proportion of online sales is another cornerstone in the LCC toolbox to contain costs 
and this is representative in the Latin American market as Gol and Azul sold 82% and 85% 
respectively of its seat inventory through its web and app interfaces in 2018. Meanwhile, 
Avianca only managed 21.5% because of its heavy reliance on expensive GDS intermediaries 
that are largely affiliated to full service carriers (Azul, 2018; Avianca holdings, 2018; Gol, 
2018). Hanke (2018) argues that online shoppers paid on average 11.5% less than customers 
buying their airfare tickets through a 3rd party. Chong and Law (2018) found that the 
combination of the ease and perceived lower cost of booking a ticket through a LCC website 
was a key determinant for purchase. 
 
Ancillary revenues have now become an integral and sustainable component of the low cost 
carrier business model (O’Connell and Warnock-Smith, 2013). Volaris, earned over one-third 
of its revenues from ancillaries during the first half of 2019, while Azul generated $24.40 per 
passenger in 2018 (Azul, 2018; Flightglobal, 2019). Warnock-Smith et al. (2017) found 
through a survey that ‘a la carte’ products that are predominately offered by LCCs such as 
baggage, seat assignment, leg room, etc, received a high ‘willingness to pay’ from passengers 
and the concept is increasingly being accepted by the public as the traveling norm. Other 
features pertinent to LCCs include rigorous cost control, which is also highly evident within 
the Latin American based LCCs (Pearson et al., 2015; Pearson and Merkert, 2014; de Wit and 
Zuidberg, 2012; Doganis, 2010; Dennis, 2007; O’Connell and Williams, 2005; Lawton, 2002).  
However, Copa Airlines revealed some contrasting ‘best in class’ metrics when benchmarked 
against the dominant FSCs and LCCs that operate in Latin America as illustrated in Figures 6, 
7 and 8. It shows that Copa has remained relatively steadfast, with little deviance from its 
performance indices between 2012 and 2016. It is a forthright leader in profitability, 
connectivity, airport attractiveness, market structure, external factors and convenience when 
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benchmarked against the other Latin American incumbents. Each of these factors will be 
further investigated in the next section as the final objective of the research was to provide 
supporting empirical evidence as to why these particular elements positively contributed to 
Copa Airlines’ profitability. The resulting analysis was discussed with Copa’s CEO to 




Fig. 6. Overview of averaged POA results for Latin American FSCs, LCCs and Copa 



























Fig. 7. Overview of averaged POA results for Latin American FSCs, LCCs and Copa 
Airlines in 2014 
 
Fig. 8. Overview of averaged POA results for Latin American FSCs, LCCs and Copa 
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5.0 Copa Airlines performance indicators and its formula for success.  
 
This section delves deeper into those main indicators (connectivity, airport attractiveness, 
market structure, external factors and convenience) that positively impact Copa Airlines 
financial dominance. The resulting analysis was shared with Copa Airlines CEO, Pedro 
Heilbron through an interview who provided more insightful and comprehensive inputs. The 
scrutiny starts with a brief background to the Panamanian incumbent. The possible limitation 
of applying inputs from high level management into single case study analyses is the potential 
generalization and utility concerns that originate from such an endeavour. The authors’ intent 
was to underpin the quantitative POA benchmarking analysis with a qualitative narrative from 
the CEO. Without the CEO having any prior knowledge of the POA results, a corroborating 
narrative from him would serve to further validate the POA results. This approach ensures the 
tripartite ensemble of epistemological, ontological and axiological applications of involving a 
CEO to provide validity to the study.  
 
5.1. Background 
Copa Airlines commenced operations 71 years ago with the help of Pan Am, which provided 
technical and capital assistance. Initially, Copa served three domestic destinations in Panama 
and in the 1960s, it began international services. During the 1980s, Copa suspended its 
domestic services to focus on international flights. It began strengthening its international 
markets, through a comprehensive Skyteam alliance with Continental Airlines in 1998, which 
acquired 49% of Copa’s shares. This synergy allowed the two carriers to extensively code 
share, perform joint marketing and exchange technical expertise (Copa Airlines, 2017). When 
Continental merged with United Airlines (Star alliance) in 2009, the Panamanian incumbent 
then aligned its network and Frequent Flyer Program with United. Copa launched an IPO in 
December 2005 and today it has a market capitalisation of $3.3 billion (Nasdaq 2018). In 2017, 
Copa transported 9.5 million passengers, double the number carried in 2008 with 78 737s 
(different variants) and 15 E190s with an average age of 8.1 years, while it has a further 61 737 
Max on order. Author calculations determine that Copa’s unit costs are exceptional because, 
despite being a full service airline, it has a CASK3 similar to established LCCs such as easyJet 
and JetBlue while the utilisation per aircraft is high, averaging 12.2 hours per day in 2018. It 
currently operates around 350 daily scheduled flights to 78 destinations in 32 countries through 
                                                          
3 The lower values of CASK for Copa in Figures 6, 7 and 8 indicate a better performance on the radar plots. 
20 
 
its own metal to South, Central and North America as well as the Caribbean and through its 
affiliation with the Star alliance, it is able to extend its network reach to 146 international 
destinations through additional code share agreements (Copa Holdings, 2018). It generates over 
97% of its revenues from passengers, while income from cargo operations comprises just over 
2%, with the remaining 1% coming from ancillaries. It plans to grow its ancillary revenues by 
a factor of three, however, reaching $50 million by 2019 (Flightglobal, 2018; Copa Holdings 
2018). Its prolific growth is noteworthy as OAG scrutiny reveals that it has seen a sevenfold 
increase in its capacity (ASKs) since 2000. This continuous growth has largely been made 
possible by the success of its hub, which has made Tocumen International Airport into Latin 
America’s leading gateway, while also reinforcing Panama’s status as a strategic center for 
connectivity, logistics and trade in the Americas. Copa’s CEO Pedro Heilbron added some 
additional key factors that had positively impacted Copa’s fortunes including: a world class 
product and strong brand together with a senior management team that has been in-situ for 
many decades, keeping the long term strategy aligned and focused. Copa’s goal-oriented 
culture and incentive programs have contributed to a motivated work force focused on 
satisfying customers, achieving efficiencies and growing profitability. In additional when 
corporate operational and financial targets are met, employees are eligible to receive bonuses 
depending on the amount of profits generated (Heilbron, 2017; Copa Holdings, 2018).  
 
5.2 Connectivity 
One of the defining attributes is Panama’s geographical positioning which provides a unique 
fulcrum connecting North and South America that is reachable with narrowbodies to nearly all 
points across the Americas, while the CEO emphasised that Panama’s geography is Copa 
Airlines’ greatest asset and the vision of the Panamanian incumbent is to harness this 
opportunity. Heilbron (2017) stated that Copa operates aircraft very effectively by placing the 
right sized aircraft for the market with a frequent service, serving a combination of both the 
principal cities of Latin America and a growing number of secondary cities as it capitalises on 
its geography. Copa’s use of narrowbody aircraft on long haul routes (sectors over 4,500 
kilometres) produces world-record breaking accolades as it schedules 437 weekly long haul 
narrowbody flights from its Panama hub, which is 127 more departures than second placed 
United Airlines and 227 more than American Airlines and tripling that of Icelandair 
(Anna.aero, 2018). This positively impacts its seat mile costs and aircraft utilisation rates. 
Copa’s hub allows it to consolidate traffic and provide non-stop or one-stop connecting services 
on over 2,000 city pairs. This strategy has allowed Panama City to become one of the most 
21 
 
connected cities in the Americas. Copa Airlines serves 72 airports in the Americas while more 
than half of these routes (38) are operated with an average of a daily service and an additional 
15 are operated with 3 daily services or more. Heilbron (2017) stated that Copa in 2011 
switched from a four-bank hub structure to a six-bank structure facilitating convenient early 
morning and afternoon flight waves, while its minimum connecting time is around 70 minutes 
(OAG, 2017). Its load factors averaged 81% and are considered high as Wanke and Barros 
(2016) researched that load factors are generally low within Latin American airlines. Data 
calculated from a MIDT database found that Copa Airlines carried 2.5 million passengers 
between North America and South America via its hub at Tocumen airport in 2017 generating 
almost $844 million. It also transported over 830,000 passengers between North America and 
Central America reaping $223 million, while 154,000 transited its hub between North America 
and Caribbean destinations in 2017. Approximately 500,000 passengers traveling on Copa 
Airlines from North America terminated their journeys’ in Panama in the same year (Sabre, 
2018).  
 
5.3 Airport Attractiveness 
Perelman and Serebrisky (2010) concluded that Latin American airports were less efficient 
than Asian and North American airports. Furthermore, the region has important infrastructure 
challenges: airports have insufficient capacity for the current and forecasted increase in traffic 
in the region and there is a scarcity of secondary airports to absorb this growth, encompassed 
by a regulatory burden across the continent (CAPA, 2017; IATA, 2016). However, IATA 
(2017) states that Panama has the best air transport infrastructure in Latin America and 6th best 
in the world. Heilbron (2017) stresses the importance of such strong infrastructure by indicating 
that Tocumen4 was only unavailable for flight operations for just two hours per year over the 
last few years. The CEO highlights the benefits of its unconstrained hub, which is the only 
airport in Central America with two operational runways at sea level altitude allowing aircraft 
to operate with full payload without any performance restrictions which would occur at higher 
altitude airports. Panama has year round good weather, boosting their flight completion factors. 
At Tocumen international airport, Copa has a seat on the board of the semi-autonomous airport 
                                                          
4 There are five airports in Panama that provide international services, namely Tocumen, Balboa, Bocas Del Toro, 
David and Panama City Paitilla. Nevertheless, Tocumen International Airport controls 94% of the country’s 
scheduled seat capacity but virtually all international flights use Tocumen making it Panama’s gateway. Copa 
controls 81% and 75% of seats and flights respectively (OAG, 2017). Tocumen is serviced by 16 international 
airlines, 15 of which are full service carriers while US based Spirit Airlines is the only LCC operating. In 2017, it 




corporation and Heilbron asserts that the co-operation between the two is very synergetic. 
Heilbron (2017) further illustrated that the airport has invested over $1 billion in a new 
terminal, which has alleviated the pressure on a domiciled home based carrier by constructing 
20 additional gates, which will enable the airport to have 54 contact gates, allowing its overall 
capacity to grow from its present 14 million to 21 million passengers. Traffic at Tocumen has 
been growing at a CAGR of 13.3% since 2003 and there is a visionary master-plan underway 
to build a third runway together with a new cargo facility and a duty free zone by 2024. This 
bipartisan relationship between Copa and the airport allows for synchronised expansion, while 
Aviation Strategy (2012) indicated that Copa benefits from the highly competitive user fees at 
Tocumen.  
 
5.4 Market Structure 
Another key strength of Copa Airlines is its strategy to focus on underserved thin markets 
between North, Central, South America and the Caribbean. OAG analysis reveals that Copa 
has a complete monopoly on over 70% of their routes, far superior to that of their peers in the 
region. Heilbron (2017) states it takes full advantage of being the only operator on the route. 
The average number of operators per route is just 1.7, which is abundantly lower than its full 
service competitors (OAG, 2017). Analysis affirmed that it has a 50% share in 45% of its 
markets, while 65% of its passengers emanate from these markets. Heilbron (2017) also states 
that it code shares with 13 carriers, while it has a comprehensive agreement with United 
Airlines on 124 routes. Copa has had an antitrust immunity partnership with United Airlines 
since 2001 on which it shares a reciprocal FFP and it also encourages cooperation in marketing 
and other operational initiatives. It launched its own FFP in 2015 which succeeded its 
predecessor under the auspices of United Airlines (MileagePlus) and rolled out a co-branded 
joint product in most of Latin America, which enabled Copa to develop brand loyalty among 
travelers. The co-branding of the MileagePlus loyalty program helped Copa to leverage the 
brand recognition that Continental (merged into United) already enjoyed across Latin America 
and has enabled Copa to compete more effectively against regional competitors such as 
Avianca and the Oneworld alliance represented by American Airlines and LATAM Airlines 






5.5 External factors 
The region is dependent on low-income economies with weak currencies, high inflation and 
steep taxes. However, Panama has a dollarized home economy with average GDP growth of 
around 7% from 2012-2016 together with an exceptionally low unemployment rate of 2.7% 
and annual inflation of 2.9% (IMF, 2017). Heilbron (2017) emphasises that the connectivity 
that Copa generates supports the country’s strong GDP growth and spreads economic and 
social benefits across Panama and Latin America. Oxford Economics (2017) states that aviation 
contributes $7.3 billion to Panama’s GDP annually, representing almost 15% of its total GDP. 
It is the second most competitive economy in Latin America (after Costa Rica) based on World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index for 2017/18, which tracks over 100 
indicators whose aggregated scores have positively contributed to the external factors of the 
POA model for Copa (World Economic Forum, 2017). Panama has been ranked by the IMF, 
World Economic Forum and the Latin Business Chronicle as one of the most competitive and 
globalised economies in Latin America based on factors such as direct foreign investment, 
international trade, GDP growth, low inflation and security (Euromonitor, 2017). These factors 
have contributed to Copa’s success as Aguilera et al. (2016) identified that the Panamanian flag 
carrier is the 21st most internationalised company in Latin America, deriving the majority of its 
sales from outside its home country and by having a strong presence in multiple countries.  
 
5.6 Convenience 
Copa Airlines is the 3rd most punctual (On Time Performance) airline in the world at 86.4% in 
2017 and most punctual carrier in Latin America for the fourth consecutive year (OAG, 2018; 
CNN, 2018). Equally its completion factors have been steadily over 99.7% for the last few 
years making it amongst the best in the global industry (Heilbron, 2017). It has exponentially 
grown its frequencies over the last decade from 30,000 in 2006 to 120,000 by 2016 (OAG, 
2018). It offers all of the trimmings of a full service product as its in-flight products include: 
Audio-Video-on-Demand (AVOD) screens at every seat; inclusive multi course meals; 
complimentary alcoholic drinks; pillows and blankets. Business Class on the 737s is equipped 
with: reclinable leather seats attached with footrests and adjustable headrests; a 110-volt power 
outlet; and a USB port. The CEO states that having a consistent product is very important and 
this strategy is reflected in its regional Embraer aircraft, which has a similar business class 
product to the 737s with a four abreast seating configuration that has a 40-inch pitch. Heilbron 
(2017) states that customer satisfaction is extremely high as the passengers have a value 
enabling full service product that exceeds their expectation as Copa’s average fares have fallen 
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from $223.50 in 2013 to $173.40 by 2017 as indicated in their annual report (Copa Airlines, 
2018). Its passenger segmentation gives it a differentiated advantage as 40% of its travelers 
partake on journeys for business purposes, while only 10% of its offered capacity is business 
class. It has received accolades from Skytrax for the best airline in Central America and the 
Caribbean for three consecutive years, while it also received awards for Best Airline Staff 
Service in Central America/Caribbean (Copa Airlines, 2018).  
 
6.0 Recommendations, contributions, conclusions and limitations 
 
The Latin American air transport market is expected to double in traffic over the next two 
decades. However, it is marred by a wide range of impediments, ranging from: regulatory 
barriers, operational inefficiencies, high taxes, monopoly controlled suppliers, tight liquidity, 
inadequate infrastructure and exposure to external influences such as low income economies, 
weak currencies and low GDP growth rates. Subsequently the profits generated by Latin 




This research is based on commercial datasets that are layered into an academic contextual 
framework. The research is significant as it depicts the dominant carriers within Latin America 
and assigns a wide spectrum of indices that govern their commercial performance, which is 
graphically illustrated through radar plots. A Product and Organisational Architecture (POA) 
framework was employed to detect ‘best-in-class’ benchmark comparisons of the seven most 




Three core findings unfolded from the research: Firstly, the three major full service network 
airlines comprising LATAM, Avianca and Aeromexico all shared common characteristics 
within the POA framework, whereby attributes such as connectivity, convenience and comfort 
performed well; Secondly, the low cost carriers displayed different patterns where they 
excelled in areas such as productivity, online sales and secondary airports, but underperformed 
in the product architecture areas where the network airlines gained the most value; Thirdly, it 
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was found that Copa Airlines has been Latin America’s financially outperforming carrier over 
many decades, accounting for over half of total profits for Latin American carriers in 2016, 
thereby warranting deeper investigation. Further penetrative analysis was conducted with the 
POA results being qualitatively corroborated by the CEO of Copa Airlines. The results 
produced a blueprint of the main performance indicators which were responsible for upholding 
Copa’s sustained financial success. There is an opportunity for underperforming Latin 
American based airlines to benchmark the performance indicators of Copa Airlines against 
their own and to determine the range of deviances between themselves and Copa. The principle 
outperforming performance indicators of Copa Airlines consisted of the following factors: 
geographical positioning; cost leadership; unique low market concentration of competitors; a 
world class product; strong brand; punctuality; a high flight completion factor; a dollarized 
economy with strong GDP growth; longevity of the management team; an incentivised 
workforce; connectivity; airport attractiveness; market structure and convenience.  
 
6.3 Recommendations for other Latin American carriers 
Copa Airlines, equipped with favourable operating costs, has capitalised on becoming a super-
connector by primarily connecting traffic between North and Central/South America that is 
reachable with narrowbodies by engineering a fine tuned operational hub based on its 
geography – the foundations are well rooted for Copa Airlines to continue to prosper and 
become a ‘successful blueprint’ for medium sized Latin American carriers to replicate. A 
strong brand, punctuality, high flight completion factors, a low concentration of competitors, a 
world class product and cost leadership are all non-specific (i.e. those not related to local geo-
economic indicators) factors found during Copa’s analysis that other Latin carriers can actively 
look to replicate. 
 
6.4. Limitations and future research 
The limitations of the POA are numerous. Markets that are not deregulated will produce totally 
different findings to those that have open skies. 100% state owned airlines like Aerolineas 
Argentinas cannot be fully captured by the model as there is very limited public data available. 
The issues surrounding demand elasticities and passenger segmentation are also not properly 
captured. Carriers that are affiliated to alliances have significant differences to non-aligned 
carriers and produce bias in the findings, while the impact from antitrust immunity and JVs are 
not considered. The continent overall faces significant impediments as about two-thirds of 
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airline costs are demarcated by oligopolies or monopolies, which are largely government 
controlled entities, governed by strict labour regulations, impacting on results. The region is 
dependent on low-income markets with weak currencies, high inflation and steep taxes. It is 
difficult to validate the model for a region as large as Latin America; however for smaller 
individual countries such as Panama it becomes more attainable. The limitations of applying 
inputs from high level management into single case study analysis are the potential 
generalization and utility concerns that originate from such an endeavour – to this end it will 
be important for any future research to increase the number of Latin American cases, subject 
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Table 3 Annex. POA model data – performance ratios in 2016 




6.00% 6.30% 7.10% 6.60% 12.50% 11.70% 5.20% 
OP. REVENUE YIELD 6.93 8.59 7.01 9.85 7.49 4.13 9.22 
OP. COST 
CASK 0.066 0.082 0.058 0.088 0.055 0.050 0.083 
Fuel /ASK 15.24 16.66 17.85 16.17 14.91 10.34 20.45 
CONNECTIVITY 
Departure/hour 13.39 15.40 9.13 16.15 12.79 6.58 8.17 
Nº Routes 655 450 545 255 171 272 593 
Codesharing 
Routes 
398 151 85 190 198 0 28 




13.39 15.40 9.13 16.15 12.79 6.58 8.17 
Punctuality 81.85 80 86 71 88.4 75.4 89 
% 
business/route 
0.02 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.01 
Airport 
Satisfaction 




5.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 
Seat Width 31.61 33.38 31.00 32.61 31.30 31.00 32.20 
Seat Pitch 17.57 17.49 17.50 17.89 17.62 18.00 17.33 





26.40% 18.90% 80% 14.70% 19.20% 62.50% 87% 
Cost/passenger 
sales 





10.04 10.30 11.20 11.20 10.60 12.80 10.10 
Aircraft sectors 
per day 
7.71 4.94 5.93 4.73 3.38 4.89 5.80 
Aircraft Type 
Uniformity 
0.46 0.37 1.00 0.40 0.85 0.83 0.60 
Aircraft 
Average age 





1,349.48 1,399.74 2,137.67 793.68 974.24 3,294.91 1,999.81 
Employee 
 /aircraft 
155.55 124.62 126.12 84.052 87.42 66.00 83.15 






16.09 7.43 6.46 37.09 6.52 10.55 6.42 
% traffic at the 
hub 









6.45% 26.46% 23.30% 19.52% 68.28% 31.62% 53% 
Operators per 
route 
3.36 2.95 2.74 2.54 1.7 2.23 2.02 
Capacity 
Share/route 
2.92% 2.60% 1.96% 1.91% 2.22% 1.47% 1.10% 
ANCILLARY 
STRUCTURE 
% of ancillaries’ 
revenues 




8.05 6.11 10.64 15.39 10.46 20.39 12.84 
EXTERNAL 
FACTORS 
Exchange Rate 0.00149 0.00033 0.29753 0.04872 1 0.04872 0.29753 
GDP per capita 19662.9 15365.5 15127.8 17861.60 23014.70 17861.60 15127.8 
Inflation Rate 3.50% 6.00% 6.30% 3.36% 0.80% 3.36% 6.30% 
Unemployment 
Rate 








LATAM AVIANCA GOL AEROMEXICO COPA VOLARIS AZUL 
Operating Margin 
MAX 
SCORE 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.19 1.00 0.89 0.00 
YIELD 
MAX 
SCORE 0.49 0.78 0.50 1.00 0.59 0.00 0.89 
CASK 
MIN 
SCORE 0.57 0.15 0.79 0.00 0.87 1.00 0.13 
Fuel /ASK 
MIN 
SCORE 0.52 0.38 0.26 0.42 0.55 1.00 0.00 
Departure/hour 
MAX 
SCORE 0.71 0.92 0.27 1.00 0.65 0.00 0.17 
Nº Routes 
MAX 
SCORE 1.00 0.58 0.77 0.17 0.00 0.21 0.87 
Codesharing Routes 
MAX 
SCORE 1.00 0.38 0.21 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.07 
Waves at hub 
MAX 




SCORE 0.71 0.92 0.27 1.00 0.65 0.00 0.17 
Punctuality 
MAX 
SCORE 0.60 0.50 0.83 0.00 0.97 0.24 1.00 
% business/route 
MAX 
SCORE 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.10 
Airport Satisfaction 
MIN 
SCORE 0.33 1.00 0.44 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 
Customer Service 
MAX 
SCORE 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Seat Width 
MAX 
SCORE 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.13 0.00 0.50 
Seat Pitch 
MAX 
SCORE 0.36 0.24 0.26 0.83 0.43 1.00 0.00 
Wi-fi 
MAX 
SCORE 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% online bookings 
MAX 
SCORE 0.16 0.06 0.90 0.00 0.06 0.66 1.00 
Cost/passenger sales 
MIN 




SCORE 0.00 0.09 0.42 0.42 0.20 1.00 0.02 
Aircraft sectors per 
day 
MAX 




SCORE 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.76 0.73 0.36 
Aircraft Average age 
MIN 








SCORE 0.00 0.35 0.33 0.80 0.76 1.00 0.81 
ASK/employee 
MAX 
SCORE 0.14 0.01 0.22 0.23 0.50 1.00 0.00 
Airport &en route 
charges/ passenger 
MIN 
SCORE 0.68 0.97 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 
% traffic at the hub 
MAX 
SCORE 0.61 0.57 0.00 0.25 0.95 0.41 1.00 
Annual passengers 
at hub (M) 
MIN 
SCORE 0.67 0.41 0.00 0.12 0.79 1.00 0.85 
% of monopolies 
MAX 
SCORE 0.00 0.32 0.27 0.21 1.00 0.41 0.76 
Operators per route 
MIN 




SCORE 1.00 0.83 0.48 0.45 0.62 0.21 0.00 
% of ancillaries’ 
revenues 
MAX 
SCORE 0.08 0.02 0.40 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.45 
Average revenue per 
passenger. 
MAX 
SCORE 0.14 0.00 0.32 0.65 0.30 1.00 0.47 
Exchange Rate 
MAX 
SCORE 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.05 1.00 0.05 0.30 
GDP per capita 
MAX 
SCORE 0.58 0.03 0.00 0.35 1.00 0.35 0.00 
Inflation Rate 
MIN 
SCORE 0.51 0.05 0.00 0.53 1.00 0.53 0.00 
Unemployment Rate 
MIN 
SCORE 0.45 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.00 
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Table 5 Annex. Final scores from the POA model results for 2016 
 Latam Avianca Gol Aeromexico Copa Volaris Azul 
OPERATING PROFITABILITY 
INDEX 
1.096 1.507 2.603 1.918 10.000 8.904 0.000 
OPERATING REVENUE 
STRUCTURE INDEX 
4.908 7.808 5.040 10.000 5.888 0.000 8.903 
OPERATING COST 
STRUCTURE 
5.425 2.590 5.282 2.066 7.132 10.000 0.674 
CONNECTIVITY INDEX 10.000 6.591 3.493 6.864 9.077 0.827 3.625 
CONVENIENCE INDEX 5.320 9.402 3.900 6.195 10.000 0.576 3.272 
COMFORT INDEX 4.362 8.833 2.707 10.000 5.643 4.440 8.611 
SALES AND DISTRIBUTION 
STRUCTURE INDEX 
4.551 1.796 9.245 0.000 3.989 9.428 10.000 
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTIVITY 
INDEX 
5.680 2.803 8.864 3.434 4.405 10.000 5.205 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
INDEX 
1.322 1.129 3.076 2.747 4.502 10.000 2.379 
AIRPORT ATTRACTIVENESS 
INDEX 
7.246 6.495 3.136 1.164 9.513 9.496 10.000 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
INDEX 
0.845 3.373 3.503 3.830 10.000 5.434 7.446 
ANCILLARY STRUCTURE 
INDEX 
1.130 0.070 3.508 4.192 1.779 10.000 4.639 
EXTERNAL FACTORS INDEX 4.232 0.750 0.705 5.183 10.000 5.183 0.705 
 
 
 
 
